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Abstract 
Cloud computing is an attempt to stretch the operation boundaries dynamically on-demand 
which is not the case with traditional distributed system. This unprecedented nature of cloud 
though offers various benefits it also has a downside when it comes to fault tolerance since most 
of the faults experienced by the cloud are unpredictable and thus Byzantine in nature. Byzantine 
faults in cloud computing is a serious problem because of the fault propagation possibility exists 
which makes the fault to propagate surreptitiously through consecutive virtual components still it 
spreads throughout the entire cloud system. Consequently the real-world problems faced by the 
cloud computing management are beyond typical human narratives. However if a virtual system 
is not effectively designed to tolerate Byzantine faults, it could lead to a faultily executed 
mission rather than a cloud crash. The cloud could recover from the crash but it could not 
recover from the loss of credibility. Moreover no amount of replication or fault handling 
measures can  be helpful in facing a  Byzantine  fault  unless  the  virtual system  is designed  to 
detect, tolerate and eliminate  such  faults. However research efforts that are made to address 
Byzantine faults have not provided convincing solutions vastly due to their limited capabilities in 
detecting the Byzantine faults. As a result, in this paper the Cloud system is modeled as a 
discrete system to determine the virtual system behavior at varying time intervals. A delay 
variation variable as a measure of deviation for the expected processing delay associated with the 
virtual nodes takes values from the set of P {low, normal, high, extreme}. Similarly, a check sum 
error variable which is even computed for intra nodes that have no attachment to TCP/IP stack  
takes values from the set of P {no error, error}. These conditions are then represented by the 
occurrence of faulty events that cause specific component mode transition from fail safe to fail-
stop or byzantine prone. The correlation analysis is performed and the result shows that the 
proposed system show considerable improvement in detecting the Byzantine faults.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Cloud computing is the Internet based computing which provides elastic services and allot 
resources on-demand. Cloud computing involves using data center servers and software 
networks to dynamically allocate resources and applications on-the-fly for remote end users. 
Since the arrival of distributed computing various other concepts based upon collective resource 
utilization using Internet as back bone has culminated into flexible Cloud computing. It managed 
to offer solutions from expensive enterprise level such as private cloud to cost effective casual 
user level solutions such as public cloud Chunye et al (2010). This helped the service providers 
to bursting the clouds i.e to configure the resources from both ends to meet their requirement 
thus the hybrid cloud emerges Bhaskar et al (2009).  For instance a company could vastly use 
public cloud services but to handle occasional bursts in activity it could summon the on-demand 
private cloud services in to its armory. Whereas for users who look for cost effective solutions 
can utilize the private clouds for certain sensitive component while hosting other components on 
the public cloud.  
        Moreover Cloud computing as a service-oriented architecture sees everything as service. 
Conversely the Cloud computing service providers offer services according to the three standard 
models they are Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as 
a Service (SaaS) Bhaskar et al (2009).  Software as a Service (SaaS) is the capability provided to 
the consumer to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The 
applications are made accessible from various client devices through either thin client interface 
or program interface.  Platform as a Service (PaaS) provides cloud capability to the consumer to 
deploy consumer created or acquired applications created using programming languages, 
libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) allows 
the consumer to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing 
resources Chunye et al (2010). However to establish the service oriented architecture the cloud 
service providers enable features such as Resource pooling, Rapid elasticity, Measured service, 
On-demand self-service, auto scaling, interoperability, multitenancy, flexibility in cost, space 
and time improvisation etc. This has led the cloud computing to see exponential growth. Due to 
its business success many cloud services emerges in to market which are usually large-scale and 
very complex to manage.            
       In all the offered services the consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, and applications. However 
for the customer, limited control over selecting and configuring them may be brokered in cloud 
Service level agreement (SLA). Consequently examining the cloud at its functional levels of 
services to make it a fault tolerant system becomes a more pressing research concern. The entire 
Cloud functionality revolves around virtualization. Virtualization is the process of creating 
virtual version of components such as computing hardware, storage devices, and computer 
network resources Rohan et al (2012). The criticality behind virtualization is to host various 
virtual components on single real component to help utilizing resources to its maximum potential 
and maximum availability. The dynamically created virtual components are often termed as 
virtual machines for those who argue cloud is no longer a virtualization it is termed as nodes. 
Nevertheless using virtual machines for various mission-critical applications also creates several 
challenges at all levels of cloud service functionality. Key challenges involves but not limited to; 
developing critical virtualization solution to suit HPC needs Chunye et al (2010), managing 
critical virtual machines and proper utilization of advanced capabilities enabled by virtualization 
for fault tolerance such as VM pause, VM checkpoint, and VM migration Stephen et al (2010).  
       The challenges are often the result of unpredictable behavior of the nodes or of the transient 
links between them. Unlike usual software or a hardware which has an operational boundary 
whereas cloud computing is an attempt to stretch this operation boundaries. This is 
unprecedented and thus the faults the cloud experience mostly is unpredictable and undetectable 
therefore fatal in nature. Such fatal faults often have the potential to crash the nodes, to cause 
link disconnection and may also result in complete cloud shutdown. For example, LinkUp 
(MediaMax) a Cloud service provider went out of business after losing 45% of stored client data 
due to a single error Christian et al (2009). Amazons supposedly fool-proof mission-critical EC2 
cloud services crash leads to permanent loss of sensible data the story continues.  
           As a result, no matter how comprehensive the management solutions are, the real-world 
challenges faced by the cloud computing is expected to evolve and thus remains a challenge. 
However if a virtual system is not effectively designed to tolerate such faults, it could lead to a 
defective execution or complete cloud crash Kevin et al (2003). Research efforts made to address 
fault tolerance issues have not provided convincing solutions vastly due to their limited 
capabilities in detecting the faults. As a result, the research community is still thriving for 
necessary solutions to achieve promising reliability and dependability criterion even when 
byzantine faults occurs Kevin et al (2003). The following section look into various aspects of the 
faults that can lead up to byzantine faults and the succeeding section will discuss the methods 
necessary to face the byzantine fault with minimal damage to availability and reliability criterion.   
  
  
2. Existing System 
 
2.1   Cloud Fault and Solutions a Critical review  
 
The fault occurs due to the malfunction or deviation from expected course of action or due to the 
involvement of malicious element Rafael et al (2006). Tolerance is the existence of methods to 
handle such faults to sustain the continuous functionality of the system.  
2.1.1   Cloud Faults 
Fault occurs due to reasons such as hardware failure, software bugs, operator error, network 
problems, security breaches, virtual component failure, virtual link failure etc. Faults occur in 
cloud can be classified into one of three categories:  
Transient faults usually occur in the communicating channel between processing nodes either in 
intra or inter cloud nodes. If the node is connected to another cloud node through TCP/IP 
protocol then it is inter node John et al (2016). Whereas the nodes which are part of the same 
system still connected to each other through a transient links are highly virtual in nature and does 
not follow the TCP/IP stack is termed as intra node. Transient faults occur once and mostly 
disappear due to the resilience in the working mechanism in case of inter nodes. However in case 
of intra nodes the transient faults are more persistent and often requires manual troubleshooting.   
Intermittent faults occur at irregular intervals in a device or system that functions normally at 
other times. Intermittent fault occurring in intra node are much more complicated then the inter 
node faults and have the potential to evolve as byzantine fault. Detecting them becomes more 
challenging since it produces results even when the fault occurs. The real system can be 
equipped with various features such as alert raising mechanism, bypassing the error element, etc. 
However grooming the Virtual Machines to face such errors still remains a challenge due to the 
lack of detection mechanisms Ravi et al (2013).   
 Permanent faults are the mostly occurring failure in Cloud intra nodes. It persists until the faulty 
virtual component is dealt with.  It is different from traditional repair or replace scenario as exist 
in inter nodes. Since a single persistent node or transient failure can render the entire cloud 
mission a failure, because in most cases all the involved virtual components are trying to achieve 
a single mission through undertaking its various parallel modules Kevin et al (2003).   
             Any of these faults can transpire either as fail-silent failure or as Byzantine failure. A 
fail-silent fault is predictable and detectable because the faulty units usually stop functioning and 
generate no output or produces bad output that clearly indicates failure Ravi et al (2013). A 
Byzantine fault is unpredictable and undetectable since the faulty unit continues to function but 
produces incorrect outputs often appears as correct output. However Byzantine faults in cloud 
computing is a serious problem because of the fault propagation possibility exists which makes 
the fault to propagate through consecutive virtual components still it spreads throughout the 
entire system.     
 
2.1.2   Fault Handling Prototype 
 
Following is the successive models that are considered to handle faults from cloud design level 
before implementation to the management level after implementation.  
Fault avoidance is a process of troubleshooting Cloud design and validation steps to ensure that 
the system avoids fault occurrences. It is very challenging in highly virtualized environment such 
as cloud because the paradigm of faults usually does not fall within the range of assumptions 
made and test cases derived for precursory fault evaluation. 
Fault tolerance is the realization that the faults in the cloud system are inevitable so it is 
designed in such a way that the system compensates the faults and continue operation Ifeanyi et 
al (2013). However there were scenarios when the fault happens it goes undetected thus results 
in complete system failure such as platform error. Fault tolerance can only be achieved in cloud 
systems if only the system have the capability to detect the faults before it propagate throughout 
the system.   
Fault removal is the process of removing the fault through testing, debugging, and verification as 
well as replacing failed components. It can only happen after detecting the fault while it is 
encountered in the system which is becoming hard to realize due to the existence of Byzantine 
faults. 
 
2.1.3   Fault handling Mechanisms 
 
Replication: is the use of additional hardware, software and network resources to ensure 
duplication, it is to make sure a replica of a virtual component has been created to replace the 
failed virtual component in case of failure. Replication mechanisms can be active or passive Ravi 
et al (2013). The primary difference between synchronous (active) replication and asynchronous 
(passive) replication is the way in which data is written to the replica. Most synchronous 
replication is costly real-time approach because it writes data to primary storage and the 
replication storage simultaneously. Therefore the primary copy and the replica stay 
synchronized. In contrast asynchronous replication is cost effective and near real-time method 
which writes data to the primary storage first and then copy the data to the replication storage. 
Asynchronous replication is often scheduled at convenient timings.     
Checking and monitoring the performance virtual machines is the key requirement for cloud 
service providers to meet the Cloud QoS requirements Ravi et al (2013). The metrics used to 
monitor the cloud platform are not limited to CPU Percentage, Data In, Data Out, Disk Read 
Throughput, and Disk Write Throughput etc. These metrics enable the service provider with 
techniques necessary to detect the key failure and the subsequent reconfiguration. 
 Checkpoint and Restart: The system state is captured and saved based on pre-defined 
parameters such as for regular time intervals. When the system experience a failure, it is restored 
to the previously saved correct state using the latest checkpoint information, thus prevent the 
system from the complete restarts Ifeanyi et al (2013).  
       The presented mechanisms come handy when handling any kind of faults, however 
customizing them to realize the full potential remains the challenge. Since quiet often the 
management team is puzzled with what to look for in case of subtle byzantine faults.  
 
2.2 Literature review  
 
Martin et al (2006) proposed a FaB Paxos based Byzantine consensus protocol to achieve 
consensus in two communication steps in common case. The cost for the common case two-step 
termination is high due to the higher number of acceptors as 5f + 1 required. Miguel  et al (1999) 
describes a state-machine replication algorithm to tolerate Byzantine faults in asynchronous 
systems. However reducing the resource replication still remains the challenge. Yilei et al (2011) 
presents a BFTCloud framework to work in voluntary resource cloud through selecting nodes 
based on their QoS performance. However the system is indefinite when facing byzantine faults 
which produce better QoS performance but gives inconspicuous output errors. Jun et al (2010) 
presents Read fault reduction and Write fault prediction methods to reduce page faults 
significantly. Further observation can be made to assess its capability to handle byzantine faults. 
Rudiger  et al (2012) presents a CheapBFT system to tolerate byzantine fault with one active 
replica in normal-case operation thus requires only f + 1 active replica. Since it relies on 
intensive FPGA for authentication it can be time consuming so suitable only for homogeneous 
hpc systems. Pedro et al (2011) present an algorithm and prototype that tolerate byzantine faults 
in MapReduce. The presented algorithm can be further extended for larger cloud scenarios. 
Pierre et al, (2013) has proposed a Redundant Byzantine Fault Tolerance (RBFT) algorithm to 
run several instances of a BFT protocol in parallel, and to monitor their performance in order to 
detect a malicious primary. The parallel instances of BFT may be lavish in terms of performance. 
Dominic et al, (2005) identifies three goals as (1) to add fault tolerance without modifying 
existing system, (2) to minimize the time spent in executing non fault tolerant software, and (3) 
to minimize the time and space overhead needed to detect and recover from faults. ExtraVirt 
accomplish these goals by leveraging VM technology, sharing memory and I/O devices across 
replicas. Binoy et al, (2003) present two proactive resource allocation algorithms, RBA-FT and 
OBA-FT, for fault-tolerant asynchronous real-time distributed systems. The task timeliness is 
specified by Jensen’s benefit functions and the anticipated application workload during future 
time intervals is given by adaptation functions. Objective is to maximize aggregate task benefit 
and minimize aggregate missed deadline ratio. Rohan et al, (2012) presents a generic 
checkpoint-restart mechanism based on the DMTCP checkpoint-restart package. The method is 
simple and can directly checkpoint the user-space QEMU virtual machines with the support of 
DMTCP. Therefore the generic mechanism supports only homogeneous architecture. Chanchio 
et al, (2008) design a Checkpoint Enabled Virtual Machine (CEVM) architecture to enable 
implicit system-level fault tolerance without modifying existing setup and to minimize the space 
and time overhead needed to execute software that cannot tolerate faults in HPC systems. Arun 
et al, (2007) presents an automatic proactive FT for arbitrary MPI applications to migrate an 
MPI task from a health-deteriorating node to a healthy node without stopping the MPI task. It 
uses health monitoring and load-based migration with Xen live migration mechanism. Bogdan et 
al, (2013) propose BlobCR, a dedicated checkpoint repository to take live incremental snapshots 
of the whole disk attached to the virtual machine (VM) instances. It aims to minimize the 
performance overhead of checkpointing by persisting VM disk snapshots asynchronously in the 
background using a low overhead call selective copy-on-write technique. Sheng et al, (2013) 
proposes VM-μCheckpoint, a lightweight software mechanism for high-frequency checkpointing 
and rapid recovery of virtual machines. Knowledge of fault/error latency is used to explicitly to 
address checkpoint corruption. Haikun et al, (2011) investigates design methodologies to 
quantitatively predict the migration performance and energy consumption and construct models 
for the cost prediction by using learned knowledge about the workloads at the hypervisor 
(VMM) level.  
        The list of fault tolerance research in virtualization is innumerable therefore further 
literature studies will not be listed since the objective to understand the nature of the presented 
problem simply revolves around one or two qualitative observations and therefore not 
comprehensive in nature. Hence even after all these efforts were made the Byzantine faults never 
fails to make an impact in Cloud platform and always expected to evolve to new levels. 
According to the performed literature study the following were the key elements observed to be 
considered for successful development of Byzantine fault tolerant cloud system.    
  
2.3   Cloud Computing Crisis Implications  
 
Comprehensive study on fault and the methods proposed to handle them has helped to arrive at 
following crisis deductions.  
Byzantine nature: Mostly assumed faults are fail-silent faults it happens only when the faulty 
unit is expected to stop functioning and thus produces no bad output. However in reality mostly 
occurring faults are Byzantine faults. A Byzantine fault occurs when the faulty unit continues to 
function but produces bad output usually appears as a proper output. Dealing with Byzantine 
faults is extremely difficult due to its nature of disguise.  
Unsuitable Incremental nature: Mostly derived checkpoint algorithms are incremental and 
therefore sequential in nature. Due to technological advancements even the single device 
nowadays performs parallel processing. Therefore highly parallelized platform like cloud needs 
parallel fault handling mechanism.    
Replication versus Redundancy:  Replication is usually the focused area for research which 
involves several units operating concurrently and a supervisor system to store the data in 
multiple locations. However with redundancy, only one unit functions while the redundant units 
sleep and can be invoked when the need arrives. The byzantine fault can have ill effect on both 
replication and redundancy; however the improved byzantine fault tolerant system can improve 
the redundancy. Hence the better redundancy can reduce the replication needs, falling to have a 
proper redundancy can demand costly, time and space consuming replication and yet may fail in 
case of byzantine error because the error were also getting replicated. 
Reliability and dependability trends seem to crumble at least in hybrid cloud scenario due to high 
level of heterogeneity. Disparity among nodes, existence of Single point failure due to supervisor 
malfunction, the possibility of inconspicuous error propagation among nodes and the consequent 
driving of entire system into dilapidation indicates that the dependability of modern hybrid cloud 
is at least decreasing. This development overturns the established trend of increasing HPC 
dependability. Bounding the Cloud failure behaviors at node level or transient level has become 
increasingly more difficult due to the increase in unpredictable Byzantine trends. Strategies to 
mitigate the problems are yet to make an impact. Therefore it is safe to assume that the 
anticipated rate of byzantine failure will increase and the modes of failure will become ever more 
difficult to characterize. 
Unpredictable faults: Replica damage due to intrusion has been the formidable challenge for 
cloud. 
Mission critical nature: Byzantine fault is connected with performance, since most of the 
application nowadays have performance requirement if it fails to meet the performance 
requirements it is again considered as failure of cloud system. Moreover for mission critical 
applications delay and error is not tolerated, which is thus marked as the characteristics for 
byzantine fault.    
 
3. Proposed Byzantine fault detection through Checksum Validation 
                                                                      
MD5 is one of the most common hash algorithms in use today. MD5 is a 128-bit hash function. 
Unlike its predecessors MD2 and MD4 it is one of the fastest and secure hash functions in 
common use. MD5 checksum is also widely used in Cloud enabled platforms, therefore the 
estimation processing and storage overhead for checksum is readily available for virtual 
machines. The processing and storage overhead for checksum in VM platform is estimated to be 
just 1%. John et al (2016).  
 
3.1   Capacitating the intra node  
 
MD5 is often performed at the receiving end of the TCP/IP if a node does not use TCP/IP for 
transmission then the checksum is considered unnecessary John et al (2016). The nodes are 
classified based on the transient link it is connected to as follows; If the node is connected to 
another cloud node through TCP/IP protocol then it is expected to perform checksum so such 
nodes are automatically configured with MD5. Such nodes which are connected to remote node 
through Internet protocol is termed as inter nodes for the sake of modeling. However the nodes 
which are part of the same system is still connected to each other through a transient link which 
is highly virtual in nature and does not follow the TCP/IP stack and therefore doesn’t involve 
MD5 are termed as intra nodes.  
        However the proposed work involves every node in the cloud platform to perform the 
checksum. Since a given data block will always results in unique checksum and does not collide 
with the result of another data block. Therefore when node is presented with a message and if the 
node doesn’t produce the checksum which is relevant then the node can be spotted as erroneous 
are compromised. Reconstructing the original   data from the checksum or performing collision 
analysis is usually time, cost and space constrained tasks and thus discourages the malicious 
nodes from manipulating the checksum results. Computing the MD5 checksum for any arbitrary 
data set is easy and feasible for even the resource, power, space constrained systems due to its 
simplicity. Moreover the MD5 checksum involves various computations as its operational 
procedure. The Byzantine nodes often generate genuinely looking output but are wrong due to 
the miscalculation induced through byzantine faults. Therefore when using the MD5 checksum 
to validate the node it allows a peer node to compute the checksum and propagate the message to 
other nodes, the replying node for a same message has to produce same output, the test the 
byzantine nodes may fail because of its incapability to compute incorrectly.  
 
3.2   Checksum Challenge 
 
The processing requirement of the MD5 for Cloud scenario requires sending a single message M  
by a cloud monitoring node automatically to n number of intra nodes and receive Message digest 
{H1, H2, …, Hn} in time {T1, T2,…. Tn}.  The standard message M is of the size 512 bits which 
is the required block size for MD5 and the resultant checksum is 128 bit size, since MD5 with 
small hash size is considered more secure and it is easy to compute [].  For M the supervisor or 
monitoring node has the pre-computed message digest H in time T. Now compare the set A {H} 
with B {H1,  H2, …, Hn} as follows 
 
3.3   Compare Checksum  
 
If A and B are sets and every element of B is also an element of A, then: B ⊆ A where B is a 
subset of A, That is, 
𝑩 ⊆  𝑨 𝒊𝒇 ∀𝒙(𝒙 ∈ 𝑩 →  𝒙 ∈ 𝑨) 
 This denotes that the set B has all hash values equal to the hash value of set A so the tested 
elements exhibits no processing errors.  
       If set B is not a subset of A, then B⊈A this denotes that one or few element of B exhibits 
processing error thus the difference in the hashes.  
       If the set B contains no elements equal to A then the null set {} and it is denoted by ∅.  The 
null set is often the result of the intersection and it is given as follows; 
A and B are disjoint if 𝑨 ∩  𝑩 =  ∅ 
The ∅ implies that either the entire group of observed hashes is incorrect so the entire set 
of observed nodes is compromised. It may also imply that the supervisor itself is 
compromised since the hash of set A may also exhibit error.   
        The complement of a set A refers to elements not in A.  Therefore the relative 
complement of A with respect to a set B, simply the difference of sets A and B gives the list 
of hashes which does not comply with the hash of A. In other words if there exist as set of 
hashes in set B which is generated by the erroneous nodes then; 
𝑨 \ 𝑩 =  {𝒙 ∶ 𝒙 ∈ 𝑨 | 𝒙 ∉ 𝑩} ⇒ Set of erroneous hashes 
 
3.4   Pre-computation  
 
However before starting the cloud services the monitoring node chooses the message M after 
generating the Hash A{H} and automatically send it to n number of  required nodes and receive 
Message digest B {H1, H2, …, Hn} in time {T1, T2,…. Tn}. After making sure the chosen set  
𝑩 ⊆  𝑨 𝒊𝒇 ∀𝒙(𝒙 ∈ 𝑩 →  𝒙 ∈ 𝑨) it allots the nodes to the customer and records the response time 
(processing time + transit time) as set X {T1, T2,…. Tn}.   
 
 
3.5   Operating procedures  
 
Providing cloud service involves establishing the SLA with the customers, it involves various 
QoS metrics such as among those the response time (RT) is chosen because it is simple to 
observe and ominously present in all the SLA agreement therefore associated with every cloud 
nodes. The set of nodes which is obliged by the Cloud service provider is observed by the 
destined node or supervisor.  
 
Algorithm 1: Byzantine Error Detection 
 
for each Virtual node (v) 
       if response time of  vi ≥ QoS response time  
                            //Where vi  is any node from the set of operating nodes {v1, v2….vn} 
      then   
            call checkpoint         
            call checksum challenge() 
       else  
             continue monitoring 
       end if 
  end for    
 
According to algorithm 1 for a data block if the response time for any node exceeds its QoS 
requirement then the node is check pointed and the following algorithm is called.  
 
Algorithm 2: Checksum Challenge () 
 
 Challenge ni with M 
           if H' ≠ H  
                   //denotes Byzantine error    
             then  
                      Shutdown vi  
                        Start new node as vi 
             else 
                    Call Compare delay variation () 
             end if 
 
Checksum Challenge is nothing but a collision detection, MD5 collision detection is easy and 
fast due to the avalanche effect []. It means even a small change in the message will result in a 
mostly different hash overwhelmingly. Due to the avalanche effect even if a single bit in the 
input is changed slightly the output hash changes drastically. The algorithm 2 present the node or 
nodes under observation with pre-chosen message M if it produces result which is deviant from 
the H then it exhibits checksum error either caused by the virtual link error or by the node error 
which denote the presence of Byzantine error. If a byzantine fault is detected then the algorithm 
shuts the node and starts the new VM machine. If no checksum error is detected then the partial 
set Y{ T1, T2,…. Ti } is compared with set X {T1, T2,…. Tn}   
 
Algorithm 3: Compare delay variation () 
 
for each vi 
         Select Ti in Y  
          Copy corresponding Ti in X 
                  if Ti in Y < Ti in X 
                     null fault                   //delay variation is minimal 
                     Call checkpoint optimization () 
                elseif Ti in Y = Ti in X 
                     null fault                   //delay variation is zero 
                     Call checkpoint optimization () 
                elseif Ti in Y ≥  upper bound in X 
                      Calculate  supremum  
                            if  Ti in Y ≥  supremum in X  
                                Shutdown vi  
                                Start new node as vi 
                            else 
                                Call checkpoint optimization () 
                            end if 
                     end if 
        end for 
           
3.6   Delay variation checkpoint 
 
Given a function f with domain X and a partially ordered set (Y, ≤) as codomain, an element y of 
Y is an upper bound of f if y ≥ f(x) for each x in X. if the comparison holds true for at least one 
value of x. Then it indicates the delay variation experienced is significant enough ‘high’ 
therefore checkpoint is set and replication is made. Now choose a constant value z such that z<x 
and the upper bound is calculated as (z+ x) where x ≥ X {T1, T2,…. Tn}. The upper bound is now 
set as supremum since no smaller value is an upper bound.  Now if y ≥ f (z + x) then it is 
“extreme” either it denotes Byzantine failure or performance failure therefore the node is 
shutdown after automatic transfer of workload at previous checkpoint.  
 
3.7   Discrete state modeling 
 
Cloud system is considered a discrete system because the assumed state variable as delay 
variation changes at a discrete set of points in time. Moreover the cloud system as a discrete 
system has only countable number of states. The Cloud system is considered a discrete model to 
determine the virtual system behavior at varying time intervals. These conditions are represented 
by the occurrence of events that cause specific component mode transition from fail safe to fail-
stop or byzantine prone. During the observation both the discrete component modes and the set 
of system state variables need to be tracked. Accordingly, the overall system state at time t is 
described by 
𝑿(𝒕) =  𝜣 (𝒄(𝒕), 𝒅(𝒕)) 
 
Where X(t) is the overall system state, c(t) = [c1,c2,c3, ... .cn] is a vector of discrete component 
modes computed with delay variation (Ɣ) for each component c = 1, ... .n (n: number of nodes in 
the virtual system). Assumes a discrete mode from its own set of M modes where ci= (ci1,ci2,ci3, 
... . ciM}, and d(t}= (d1,d2,d3, ... . ,dK) are the vector of system state variables. During conceptual 
design, the system state variables are not known quantitatively. Therefore, these continuous 
variables are assume as discrete since the system only involves finite number of states and the set 
of qualitative values are assumed. The vector d(t) with variable as checksum(¢)  then defines 
these qualitative values for each state variable vi from a set of P possible values di= (di1,di2,di3, ... 
. ,diP).  A delay variation variable takes on values from the set of P {low, normal, high, and 
extreme}. Similarly, a check sum error variable takes on values from the set of P {no error, 
error}. 
         The proposed system involves a lightweight state model since maintaining state 
information is essential for virtual systems to reverse the fault with the previously checkpointed 
data. The proposed model is designed to be simple since it involves processing small checksum 
and comparative delay variation monitoring. Therefore it is extendable because it allows 
additional variables if needed, and it is flexible since it creates a possibility to optimize intervals 
at which the checkpoint is placed which is usually fixed and regular therefore incurs hefty cost.  
 
4. Computation and Optimization 
 
Optimizing the proposed discrete model for a possibility to perform quick fault detection in 
lesser number of steps is analyzed using various state transition computations. Moreover 
improving Byzantine fault detection using fine-tuning the Delay variation with the Checksum is 
also analyzed. Setting the interval for virtual system state is fixed for regular interval and every 
node in the cloud system is investigated at the set interval for fault tolerance. However through 
optimization and analysis we try to optimize the interval and the number of nodes involved for 
investigation.  
 
4.1   State Transition with Delay Variation 
 
However for investigative analysis each variable involved in the algorithm has observed using 
state transition diagram individually. Initially the state transition has been obtained for delay 
variation (Ɣ) independently. The state transition diagram and table were obtained for virtual 
node states {fail-safe, Byzantine, fail-stop} with respective state variables {S0, S1, S2}. In all the 
cases S2 is considered as acceptor, since the transitions may lead up to the S2 when the transition 
reaches the S2 the checkpoint activation follows the shutting down of respective node. The Input 
as delay variation with the possible set P {low, normal, high, extreme} is represented as {00, 
01, 10, 11}.  
Table 1. State transition with delay variation 
 
Present 
State 
 
Next State 
 
00     01    10       11 
Output 
S0  S0     S0     S1       S2 0 
S1  S0     S0     S1        S2 0 
   
 
 
Figure 1. State transition diagram with delay variation 
 
 
Byzantine fault Generalization considering the delay variation (Ɣ) alone is limited. Since the 
case when delay variation is high Ɣ = 10 implies that the delay variation is not supremum 
therefore not decisive in nature, which makes the Output indecisive as well. Therefore to mark it 
as byzantine failure and checkpointing using delay variation alone may result in incorrect 
detection.   
 
4.2   State Transition with Checksum 
 
The state transition for Checksum (¢) has been investigated separately as follows. The state 
transition diagram and table were obtained for virtual node states {fail-safe, Byzantine, fail-
stop} with respective state variables {S0, S1, S2}. In all the cases when the transition reaches the 
S2 then the corresponding node is shutdown. The Input as checksum involves the possibility set 
P {no error, error} represented by corresponding binary inputs {0, 1}.   
Table 2. State transition with decisive Checksum 
 
Present State 
 
Next State 
 
   0         1          
Output 
S0    S0        S2       1 
S1    S0        S2       1 
   
 
 
Figure 2. State transition diagram for Checksum 
 
Byzantine fault Generalization considering the Checksum (¢) alone is more decisive in nature. 
Moreover it seems have eliminated the need for state transition S0 → S1, which implies that the 
checksum implementation can help to validate the virtual nodes to a greater extent. However 
MD5 can help to generalize the Byzantine error which happens due to faulty nodes and the link 
errors. In both the cases the data for hashing becomes invalid to a greater extent due to the 
avalanche effect. However in case if the node is compromised due to the presence of malicious 
element as a worst case scenario if the malicious component is equipped to allow the checksum 
operation intact it still may produce the relevant checksum. In such cases, therefore the decisive 
nature of MD5 checksum may not be simply enough. Therefore the checksum which helps to 
detect the byzantine faults may not be helpful to detect all the classes of evasive malicious 
compromise.    
 
4.3 Checkpoint optimization with simplified State Transition 
 
Optimizing the Checkpoint/Restart is often considered tricky since it is expected to operate 
within the affordable cost []. The state periodically and the number of tasks considered for 
persistent storage induces a runtime overhead and occupies more storage space and thus incurs 
the cost[]. Therefore the tradeoff is to control and keep the performance overhead involved with 
the checkpoint mechanism at acceptable levels even when the Cloud deployment grows in size 
and complexity []. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. State transition with decisive Checkpoint and simplified delay variation 
 
Present 
State 
 
Next State 
 
  00         01         10         11 
Output 
S0    S1        S2           S2         S2 1 
S1    S1        S2          S2           S2 1 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3. State transition with decisive Checkpoint and simplified delay variation  
 
The table 3 is plotted with delay variation P {high, extreme} since those are the delay that 
intimate that the observed virtual node may be transpiring to erroneous state or already 
erroneous. The values are assigned as high = 0 and extreme = 1. Similarly, the checksum 
variable takes on values from the set of P {no error, error} as no error = 0 and error = 1. 
However if no error in checksum and if the delay variation is not high or extreme then the input 
for both Ɣ¢ =0 this can happen only in state S1. This implies that after exhibiting high Ɣ in 
previous state which caused the observing node ni to transition from S0 → S1, it has recovered 
from the setback and for the current state the transition occur from S1 → S0. Therefore in the 
current state observation the Ɣ seems to be either low or normal and thus makes the Ɣ input 
missing. This helps to generalize the nodes which though shows no checksum error but shows 
slightly increased delay over consecutive state observations.   
 
Algorithm 4: Checkpoint Optimization () 
  initialize x = j                                 //where j is the pre-set initial state monitoring interval 
  for each vi in S0,  
        if  Ɣ¢ = {0} 
              Assign interval j = x+j    //reducing the processing overhead by increasing interval  
               Call Compare delay variation () 
        endif 
  endfor 
 
   initialize q = 0    //a variable to monitor the staying node for successive intervals 
  for each vi in S1;  Ɣ¢ == {00}; q+1 
                 Set j = x 
                 Call Compare delay variation () 
                 Call Checksum Challenge () 
            if q ==3 
                  Shutdown vi  
                  Start new node as vi 
           endif 
     end for         
 
For the nodes that remain in S0 the next interval for monitoring can be increased from interval j 
to 2j and after 2j it still remains in S0 the interval can be further shifted to 3j etc. Nodes in state 
S1 alone needs frequent monitoring for every interval j, If the node in S1 transitioned to state S0 
then the successive interval can be increased as long as it stays in S0. However if it transitioned 
back to S1 then the interval is reduced to initial value. Moreover for ith node if it stays at high for 
three successive intervals in state S1 then it could be suspended for evaluation. This way the 
performance improvement can be achieved even for the normal case.  
       Therefore the crucial overhead reduction is achieved through minimization of the 
interruption time and through the signification reduction of the number of Checkpoints 
implemented not only for the erroneous case but also for normal case. Moreover restart can be 
promptly initialized with previously saved checkpoint with minimal overhead. Thus the 
considered discrete model is configured through various state transition computations and 
optimization.  
 
4.4    Byzantine Fault Generalization 
 
 A Cloud system is said to be k-fault tolerant if it can withstand k faults. If the virtual node fail 
silently then it is sufficient to have k+1 component to achieve k fault tolerance. Since even if the 
k components fail the cloud system still be able to work with k replaced nodes and still has 1 
redundant node for replacement. However the success of Fault tolerance mechanisms varies 
when it comes to tolerating faults. A system can only tolerate crash faults with k+1 replication 
that to with passive replication. However solutions to the Byzantine fault tolerance usually are 
complicated therefore to tolerate byzantine faults it requires active replication system which uses 
3k +1 redundant nodes. However using the checksum for fault detection the byzantine fault 
tolerance requirement can be reduced to just K+1 replica since it is capable to generalize the 
Byzantine fault as crash faults. Therefore active replication becomes possible with online delay 
variation analysis.  
 
       
5. Result Analysis 
 
Evaluating the set of proposed algorithms to understand the real-time implications requires 
simulation and real world data analysis which is presented as follows.  
 
5.1   Experimental Setup and Simulation 
 
         The  CloudSim  is  a  development  toolkit  for  discrete  event  simulation  of  Cloud  
computing Rodrigo et al, (2010).  CloudSim supports  modeling  of  Cloud  data  centers  and  its  
simulation  with  different  hardware  configurations. In addition, this simulation toolkit helps in 
modeling a range of virtual machines having independent tasks, design, different resources and 
VM provisioning.  
        Using modified fault generators in FailureGenerator Class the byzantine fault inducer has 
been created. FaultTolerantScheduling module is extended to test the byzantine faults but it fails 
detect the byzantine faults because it does not drive the node to failure. Moreover 
FailureGenerator which doubles the size of distribution samples each time but only to 
maxFailureSizeExtension parameter. This is to limit the failure rate from reaching a point where 
it cannot be handled. In our case since the error rate is required for all the monitoring interval 
maxFailureSizeExtension has been set to maximum. Furthermore the cloud fault tolerance 
module is extended to monitoring the faults since it is not equipped to handle byzantine faults it 
exhibit limited fault generalization capabilities. Therefore by extending FileAttribute class the 
checksum attribute is set to MD5. This class also has the collision detection i.e. if (checksum < 0) 
{return false;} inherently build in it, using this better error generalization capability has been 
constructed.  
          The performance of MD5 is comprehensively studied from various perspectives due to its 
vast usage. Therefore we don’t get into those details. However the reason for widespread usage 
of MD5 in Cloud computing is evident in its speed. Among observed checksums MD5 is 
observed to perform computations very fast even on the 32-bit processors and less CPU 
intensive. Furthermore MD5 is observed to be more secure in case of smaller messages than the 
larger messages. It is thus considered as the most appropriate algorithm with essential qualities 
for observing the Virtual nodes behavior critically. 
       The Failure tolerant system of CloudSim is designed to detect the node crashes but not the 
errors. Therefore the induced Byzantine error does not derive the nodes to crash therefore evade 
the fault tolerant system. However the checksum collision observed is able to detect all the 
erroneous nodes. It is visible in the following graph since the error generated are based on the 
exponential increase the error generalization also follows the exponential increase pattern so it is 
obviously evident.  
 
 
Figure  4.  Byzantine Fault detection with and without MD5 Checksum  
 
Figure 4 shows the suitability of using the checksum algorithm to detect byzantine faults as 
promising. However the challenge is to detect the pure byzantine fault which is caused due to the 
concealed security breaches. Until now the CloudSim doesn’t provide support for such scenarios.   
 
5.2   Optimization Evaluation 
 
      As a result, the Google cloud dataset has been obtained from github.com for further analysis. 
In the data set User and job names are hashed and provided as base 64-encoded strings that can 
be tested for equality. Additionally all jobs and tasks have a scheduling class that represents the 
delay sensitive requirements, this validates the initial claim in choosing the response time as 
observable variable for performance overhead optimization. Performance measurements are 
taken for every pre-set interval which is ‘1’ second. Conversely the response time is reported in 
microseconds. The system load sometimes seems to prevent the resource metrics from being 
sampled at the desired interval, so one or more intervals may span more than a 1 second. The 
provided sampling rate as the ratio between the number of expected samples to the number of 
observed samples helps to detect the interval variation. This is ironic to the rate reduction 
interval proposed in the Checkpoint Optimization () algorithm. Therefore validating the proposed 
algorithm through deriving possibilities to increasing the interval becomes our main objective in 
sampling the dataset. Moreover checksum has been computed by the virtual nodes as just another 
task among various other tasks. This leaves a possibility for malicious element to configure the 
compromised node in such a way to allow processing the checksum intact while inducing 
miniscule errors in other tasks.   
    The checksum anomaly and delay variation has been observed throughout the data set with 
sample space of 500 nodes. The 539 hash collision has been detected as the result of analyzing 
the entire dataset. The delay variation and the hash collision percentage for the obtained result 
has been computed and plotted as following scatter diagram.  
 Figure  5.  MD5 and delay variation based fault detection possibilities (%) 
According to Figure 5 for all the cases, the percentage of variation in hash due to the 
modification of input string remains over 90 percent consistently, which is attributed to 
avalanche effect. This can help in generalizing the Byzantine errors quickly because the 
checksum comparison algorithm can detect the Byzantine error with just one checksum 
variation. Often found in immediate places from the left of the string, thus eliminate the need for 
comparing the entire string.  Moreover in all those cases the delay variation becomes evident, 
where 20% to 30% indicates that the Ɣ = 1 and the higher percentage indicates Ɣ = 0. This 
shows that the chosen parameters are good fit for byzantine error/fault generalization.   
 
 
Figure 6. Fault generalization percentage for delay variation  
 
According to figure 6 the overall delay variation (Ɣ) including both {0,1} possibilities for all the 
instances in the dataset is <17% . However within the overall 17% delay the Ɣ = 1 is 38% and 
the Ɣ = 0 is 62%.. However through excluding the Ɣ involved in checksum error instances i.e.  
64% the percentage of both delay variation become 10.88%. This indicates that, for certain 
instances even though the ¢ = 0 the delay variation still may remain at extreme. Therefore it 
could very well indicate the presence of concealed malicious elements.  
 
 
Figure 7. Optimized Observable range with Ɣ = 0 
 
In the 10.88 % excluding the delay variation Ɣ = 1 since the node exhibiting it can be 
transitioned to state S2. Observable range for delay variation just comes to Ɣ = 0 which is 
obtained with the normal distribution as between 4.88% to 14%. Therefore choosing the delay 
variation and checksum can minimize the processing overhead for regular intervals to 14% 
otherwise as 100% for every interval.   
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
A Byzantine fault is unpredictable and undetectable since the faulty unit continues to function 
but produces incorrect outputs often appears as correct output. However Fault tolerance can only 
be achieved in cloud systems if only the system have the capability to detect the byzantine errors 
before it propagate throughout the system.  Therefore the proposed work involves every node in 
the cloud platform including intra nodes to perform the checksum. Since a given data block will 
always results in a unique hash even a single error due to byzantine fault can be detected.  Using 
those variables a lightweight discrete state is modeled since maintaining state information is 
essential for virtual systems to reverse the fault with the previously checkpointed data. The 
considered discrete model is configured through various state transition computations and 
optimization. The crucial overhead reduction is achieved through minimization of the 
interruption time and through the signification reduction of the number of Checkpoints 
implemented not only for the erroneous case but also for normal case. Moreover restart can be 
promptly initialized with previously saved checkpoint with minimal overhead. The model is 
designed to be simple since it involves processing small checksum and comparative delay 
variation monitoring. Therefore it is extendable because it allows additional variables if needed, 
and it is flexible since it creates a possibility to optimize intervals at which the checkpoint is 
placed which is usually fixed and regular therefore incurs hefty cost.  
       The proposed model has been simulated using CloudSim, the results show that the suitability 
of using the checksum algorithm to detect byzantine faults as promising, since the checksum 
collision observed is able to detect all the erroneous nodes. However the challenge is to detect 
the pure byzantine fault which is caused due to the concealed security breaches. As a result, the 
Google cloud dataset has been obtained from github.com for further analysis. While sampling 
the dataset since the checksum has been computed by the virtual nodes as just another task 
among various other tasks, the possibility for malicious element to configure the compromised 
node in such a way to allow processing the checksum intact while inducing miniscule errors 
becomes evident. According to the result analysis, through involving delay variation 
considerable percentage of errors due to the concealed malicious elements has been generalized. 
The solutions to the Byzantine fault tolerance usually are complicated therefore to tolerate 
byzantine faults it requires active replication system which uses 3k +1 redundant nodes. 
However using the proposed model which involves checksum and delay variation for fault 
detection the byzantine fault tolerance requirement can be reduced to just K+1 replica. Hence the 
attempted modeling with decisive checksum and supportive delay variation has helped us to 
effectively optimize the checkpoint interval and number of nodes required for observation for 
byzantine fault as well as for deterministic cases with malicious elements. 
         However to capacitate it for more malicious fault generalization the proposed model will be 
extended for multivariate based vector inference in our future work. Moreover the possibility for 
parallel implementation in intra nodes to develop an active correlation analysis and the means to 
tolerate the single point failure in supervisor controlled cloud will be investigated in the future 
work.   
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